This is not a disproof of god or what have you, as there are phenomena which gods are ascribed to and are yet unexplained. This is merely an ontological argument that for something to exist it has to be observable.Except the claim that the spiritual exists does not depend on physical observability? Which was what my post said?
Whether we are able to predicate of this thing or that thing existence, seems a nonsensical question, for if even in concept this or that thing might be proposed, it must have some mode of existence, even if that mode is only ens rationis rather than ens reale or ens simpliciter.If something has no effect on anything then whether it exists or not is meaningless and equal to not existing.
And also,By way of answer we have to say that the Philosopher shows that 'being' is predicated in many ways. For in one sense 'being' is predicated as it is divided by the ten genera. And in this sense 'being' signifies something existing in the nature of things, whether it is a substance, as a man, or an accident, as a color. In another sense 'being' signifies the truth of a proposition; as when it is said that an affirmation is true when it signifies to be what is, and a negation is true when it signifies not to be what is not; and this 'being' signifies composition produced by the judgment-forming intellect. So whatever is said to be a being in the first sense is a being also in the second sense: for whatever has natural existence in the nature of things can be signified to be by an affirmative proposition, e.g. when it is said that a color is, or a man is. But not everything which is a being in the second sense is a being also in the first sense: for of a privation, such as blindness, we can form an affirmative proposition, saying: 'Blindness is'; but blindness is not something in the nature of things, but it is rather a removal of a being: and so even privations and negations are said to be beings in the second sense, but not in the first. And 'being' is predicated in different manners according to these two senses: for taken in the first sense it is a substantial predicate, and it pertains to the question 'What is it?', but taken in the second sense it is an accidental predicate, ... and it pertains to the question 'Is there [such and such a thing]?'.
In this way, even when we speak of the denial of the existence of a thing, that denial is said to have a certain mode of existence in the mind.We have to know that this second mode is related to the first one as effect to cause. For it is from the fact that something exists in the nature of things that the truth or falsity of a proposition follows, which the intellect signifies by this verb `is', as it is verbal copula. But, since some things which in themselves are not beings, the intellect considers as some sort of beings, like negations and the like, sometimes `is' is said of something in this second way, but not in the first. For it is said that blindness is in the second way, for the reason that the proposition is true in which something is said to be blind, but this is not said to be true in the first way. For blindness does not have real being, but is rather a privation of some being.
If you mean here by observability that our senses alone can be informed by any existent thing, for as we said above, there are numerous things that have modes of being that are insensible, and if we were to try to say that the human mind by way of its operations can conclude all that is existent, neither here do we agree, but if we say that you mean that there is a certain transcendental of being that allows for things to be known in themselves, intelligibility, here I think we could agree. Any existent thing is intelligible in itself, but not necessarily intelligible to the human mind. For if the intelligibility of things were not a matter of their being, but instead only our investigation into whether this being is, then it would seem again as though we could not agree with your claim.I mean this as a matter of physics, everything has some sort of degree of observability.
Elsewhere, the Philosopher also teaches that when what ought to be many questions, on account of the complexity of an inquiry, are reduced to one question, we are also in danger of misleading ourselves and our listeners, for in order to conclude from a question the premise that is latent and the middle term whereby the conclusion to shown forth, any multiplication of terms beyond those makes the question ambiguous.It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term . . . for clearness' sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts, if it has been made clear to him how many meanings it may have).
What precisely is meant here by evil? Before any conception of God is held by man, he knows wrongs committed by his self and towards his self, but is this precisely what is meant by evil? Epicurus here makes a contentious question, that is one that is ambiguous.Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Curiously, I am not certain that even the question of power has been clearly understood in this rhetorical argument. For it is clear that there are certain things even in this finite operation or that that cannot be otherwise. For instance, the geometer cannot square the circle, for though he has the power to arrange magnitudes, it is outside of that proper object of that power to square the circle for there is no magnitude that is a squared circle.Then he is not omnipotent.
Without even inquiring into the nature of Goodness, Epicurus here attempts to show that the lack of an operation is antithetical. Unfortunately, this cannot stand as either clear nor conclusive.Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Well according to http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/evil , evil can be defined as a supernatural force of wickedness (presumably the devil or some anti-god deity) or it can be used to mean a being that is morally wrong and by extension their actions, which again are presumably the temptations of the devil. Your logic is sort of circular here. You bring up the context of man without god and ask what is evil but if there is no evil then what point is there in introducing a god? Good and evil are two sides of the same coin as in they go together. As long as a deity exists to represent good and all that is right with the world, then evil must be those that stray away from the teachings of that deity or something that tempts those to stray away from the teachings of god.In this year of our Lord, MMXIV,
What precisely is meant here by evil? Before any conception of God is held by man, he knows wrongs committed by his self and towards his self, but is this precisely what is meant by evil? Euthyphro here makes a contentious question, that is one that is ambiguous.
You are making a big error in your statement that is comparing god who is often described as perfection and humans who have never been identified as perfect beings. You'll have to forgive me because I don't have any quotes as I am not too familiar with holy texts but I think you understand what I mean. Your second error is bringing up geometry to someone who is a big fan of geometry. Squaring the circle is not impossible in its own right but rather constructing a square with the same area as a circle is impossible to do using a compass because a compass can only make certain bisections. You are incorrect when you say "he has the power to construct the magnitudes" a circle with area pi requires a square with side lengths of root pi. Pi has been proven to be a transcendental number (meaning that it can only be approximated as an infinite sum of rational numbers) therefore it is impossible to find the magnitude of root pi in a finite amount of bisections. Furthermore there is no contradiction when I say I cannot perform something that cannot be done, however there is a clear contradiction in saying that an omnipotent being cannot perform an arbitrary task.Curiously, I am not certain that even the question of power has been clearly understood in this rhetorical argument. For it is clear that there are certain things even in this finite operation or that that cannot be otherwise. For instance, the geometer cannot square the circle, for though he has the power to arrange magnitudes, it is outside of that proper object of that power to square the circle for there is no magnitude that is a squared circle.
A better investigation into the meaning of this word is necessary.
Your writing is very eloquent but I must ask for more reasoning behind your statement here. Can we agree that good and evil form a dichotomy? If so then a diety who is indifferent to evil and chooses to do nothing in the presence of it despite having the ability to do so must also be evil by default by not opposing evil (i.e acting upon goodness). You are right though in that we do not need to actually go into the nature of what is good or evil because that is in the eye of the beholder but in any case the burden of ambiguity in good and evil lie soley on those that claimed these words in the first place. If you would entertain me, can you provide a quote or a similar example which turns this argument the other way around? I am curious to see it.Without even inquiring into the nature of Goodness, Euthyphro here attempts to show that the lack of an operation is antithetical. Unfortunately, this cannot stand as either clear nor conclusive.
These problems of rhetorical arguments such as this one too could be turned on those who would use rhetorical devices to demonstrate the existence of God, as is often the case, and we should indeed expect even of the rhetor that he not parade in dialectician's robes.
While this dictionary or that dictionary can be incredibly helpful to mark various uses, especially insofar as that dictionary agrees with other dictionaries, I do not know of a scientific method, that is a method that could produce certain knowledge, that in order to denominate the various uses of a word must turn to a compiled authority such as a dictionary. Rather, the rhetor or the dialectician must have some method to denominate various uses when no such authority is available, else if that authority must itself always be available to the rhetor or the dialectician, in what way does the lexicographer avoid such an absurd problem of the beginning of his work?Well according to http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/evil ,
This might begin to suffice for the various ways in which the word "evil" is used. Curiously, though, you begin with the supernatural use, when I think that that is the least common, and you omit many other uses such as when a thing is found contemptible, or when a thing is said to be deficient in some virtue which it ought to possess, or in the way that the lack of health is called an evil, especially the lack of health by illness, and I am not sure that we have here exhausted the number of ways in which the word "evil" is used.evil can be defined as a supernatural force of wickedness (presumably the devil or some anti-god deity) or it can be used to mean a being that is morally wrong and by extension their actions, which again are presumably the temptations of the devil.
Do you count it as my logic to say that "Before any conception of God is held by man, he knows wrongs committed by his self and towards his self, but is this precisely what is meant by evil?" In that way, would you say that I have concluded from this an affirmation or a negation that does not follow necessarily from its premises? I do not see any conclusive end to which I reached by asking this question. Rather, I have taken what we know to be the case, namely that man is not infused from the beginning with a knowledge of God, but rather comes to that knowledge either by way of instruction or investigation, and that prior to any of those investigations, it is clear that men know their wrongs. How do you mean that it is "sort of circular"? I cannot see this as more than a rhetorical device. Please, help me to see what must clearly be intended as more than rhetoric.Your logic is sort of circular here. You bring up the context of man without god and ask what is evil but if there is no evil then what point is there in introducing a god?
I do not see how the comparison fails, especially when I have said that it is clear even on the order of finite powers that certain persons might possess a power that is itself not inclusive of what is impossible, for a power's proper object must be possible, else we'd not call it a power. Now if this is so on the finite order of things, why has Euthyphro not here discussed whether it is so with an omnipotent order, an illimitable order?You are making a big error in your statement that is comparing god who is often described as perfection and humans who have never been identified as perfect beings.
I am most happy that you are yourself a fan of geometry. I have found few sciences that are as appealing to me as the geometer's, though I certainly do not think that I could claim an expertise.Your second error is bringing up geometry to someone who is a big fan of geometry.
I would say that on the question of whether without the use of compass and straightedge, if certain transcendental numbers might be used in order to approximate an equivalent area, I could not affirm that the non-constructable has produced any definite figure, as any definite length produced by the geometer, and not only an abstract length, is algebraic, and this is precisely what the transcendental numbers are not.Squaring the circle is not impossible in its own right but rather constructing a square with the same area as a circle is impossible to do using a compass because a compass can only make certain bisections.
If it were the case that Epicurus' dilemma shows it not to be an arbitrary task, then your objection would stand; however, the dilemma does not, as it is only a cursory, rhetorical device.Furthermore there is no contradiction when I say I cannot perform something that cannot be done, however there is a clear contradiction in saying that an omnipotent being cannot perform an arbitrary task.
This would be my question! And I am glad that we have arrived at much the same question. In what way would the proposer of the dilemma say that good and evil are dichotomous? In an absolute way, such that the two cannot be present in the same subject? Or in a relative way? The answer to this question, unfortunately, is the burden of the proposer of the dilemma.Can we agree that good and evil form a dichotomy?
I would be glad to entertain you, but I do not know that my knowledge is that extensive that I could. I'll be happy to spend a few days looking, though, if you would rather me do the leg-work than yourself, in order to find similar rhetorical devices in the writings of theists.If you would entertain me, can you provide a quote or a similar example which turns this argument the other way around? I am curious to see it.
If I'm going to get serious-town though, I'd say that this dude's charge that omnipotence only applies to the realm of the logically possible is probably his most powerful insight. Frankly, I'll take that; it means the concept of God is something that can be approached with logical insight, which is a far cry from the entirely faith-based, don't-question, "it's far beyond your feeble human comprehension" defense of theism I've seen tossed around before. Not that this guy is even defending theism; he doesn't seem to be arguing for much at all, actually.Elsewhere, the Philosopher also teaches that when what ought to be many questions, on account of the complexity of an inquiry, are reduced to one question, we are also in danger of misleading ourselves and our listeners, for in order to conclude from a question the premise that is latent and the middle term whereby the conclusion to shown forth, any multiplication of terms beyond those makes the question ambiguous.
On this question, even the ancient masters are divided, modern philosophical schools too. In an old aristotelian sense, however, to define a thing is to reveal all that is essential to that thing and to omit what is not. The method then depends upon the data available, for some times what is essential will be shown deductively, and at other times it will be shown inductively.what is the definition of any word ever?
The most fundamental argument is composed of three terms, which are themselves a subject and an affirmation or denial. The first of these is called the premise, which is in a way the principle of the argument, and it is also that in which the conclusion is virtually contained. The last of these is the conclusion, which is made known by a middle term which is linked in some necessary way to the premise, that is, that it follows from the premise.also what does this sentence even mean I have no idea
This seems to be the classical theistic position, although, with semantic care, distinguishing between analogical and univocal propositions, and also distinguishing between a via positiva and a via negativa. You can see this most clearly I think in the angelic doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, but also the other great doctors of the Church: Ss. Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, and Blessed Duns Scotus.. . . [the] charge that omnipotence only applies to the realm of the logically possible is probably his most powerful insight. Frankly, I'll take that; it means the concept of God is something that can be approached with logical insight
Perhaps there is a mistake here of presenting metaphysically what should only be treated pragmatically; perhaps only Ash Borer could here really tell us. I do not know.I don't think you or some others have understood Ash Borer's point. Ash Borer was talking in a practical sense, which he/she made the mistake of trying to present as a metaphysical argument or something, but the point is there nonetheless. What does it mean for something to "exist" in a meaningful sense? If you propose a substance that evades our ability to detect it in any way even in principle, can it be said to "exist" in any sense that merits the actions that people have taken in response to it? Does it justify special protections being given to some religious institutions but not others, for example?
Even in the aristotelian tradition, especially as it found its way to the modern age by the schoolmen, there have been vast developments, though I am sure that many modernists would wish to deny that the tradition has continued.philosophy has come a long way since Aristotle.
I am not sure that I could say any thing about a philosophical community, for the various schools of the philosophers have always been divided on these questions, but I can say that from within that specifically thomistic aristotelian school, I cannot think of one that agrees with Kant's division of being's intelligibility. Garrigou-Lagrange has in his text God: His Existence and His Attributes one of the best answers to Kant that I've yet read.The philosophy community by and large seems to agree with Kant that the existence of a thing-in-itself is unknowable.
It is clear that not all that can be conceived is properly said to be possible, for the imaginative power of man (or the phantasmal) is capable of arranging the various images with which we know things into a multitude of fictions, but these are no more possibly found in the things of this world. It is also clear that by use of these various powers that are commonly called reason, man is capable of conceiving of a number of things that are themselves impossible, namely, that he can be wrong. In this way, we must deny that omnipotence is strictly that power which extends to all that can be possibly conceived.What you seem to be implying is that omnipotence is not the ability to do anything that can possibly be conceived
I do not know that I could here make use of the same modifier, "merely", but I would say that an investigation into what is possible, and whether there are impossibilities that belong to the nature of things themselves, and whether among them those possibilities are themselves truly extended to all possibles even in finite things, belong to the whole number of questions that must be addressed by the rhetor that hopes to use a dilemma such as was above posted.but merely the ability to do anything that's possible
It does not follow that there are real properties that one must be without in order to do anything possible. Please, explain this argument in greater detail that I might understand it.To do anything logically possible, one has to lack properties, because properties constrain one's capabilities.
In a way, the theological tradition begins with knowing that what transcends limitation cannot be defined; although, this too belongs to that philosophy that has been left behind by so many moderns. In fact, we read in what is called the shorter Summa, or the Compendium Theologiae, that God is not defined as a finite being would be, rather we make use of an analogical way, which is commonly called via negativa.To propose an omnipotent "God", therefore, is to describe what God is NOT, rather than what God IS. That's an extremely problematic way of defining anything.
Problemata, &c.
Perhaps that is not nearly as unrelated as you might say, but, please, bear with me as I have written only what I have thought, but I will not lie that much of what I think has been affected by poor English translations of the schoolmen.On an unrelated note, it annoys me when people try to emulate how philosophers from centuries or millenia ago write.
Insofar as the word stands for a concept, and a concept has been informed by what is, we must say that those words are meaningful, for what else is meaning? Now that this word or that word stands for this concept seems arbitrary, and I would agree with you that it would be incredibly difficult to argue that somehow the meaning of this word is bound up in the formulae of its spelling and pronunciation.there are no real definitions, dictionaries are merely reifications of white authority, but there are meanings. a word has no meaning outside of a sentence, and even that sentence's place in the larger web of signification (which is indeterminate i would argue) affects how a given word will be understood by the subject who interprets it (and that subject's position has implications for how they interpret signs).
Curiously, I think that there are some theologians, especially those that make use of what is commonly called ontological arguments (Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, et al.) that are simply defining a term in such a way that existence must be predicated of it, but not showing necessarily why we must define it in this way.Anyway, I feel like if you define god through logical means then you can be accused of just defining god into existence. And if you argue that god is somehow beyond various inquiries than you get accused of an epistemological double standard. What do?
Before I address your response I feel the need to point out that this topic is going off on a tangent to what your original post as well as my response referred to. The original topic was on the question of what is evil before the concept of god, and perhaps it was my fault for not making a distinction between good vs. bad and right vs. wrong clear. A professor of mine defined being moral as having the free will to make a decision based on reasoning. Humans by this definition are morality and will make the distinction between right and wrong on their own accord. This topic is referring to good vs. bad which will not be mistaken with right or wrong. Perhaps it is wrong to add my bias, but I subscribe to the idea that good is to bring happiness to oneself and bad is the converse. The reason why I rejected your reply as circular is for the very reason; if god is something that brings good out, then evil is something that brings out bad. To reiterate, you cannot ask a question about evil before the concept of god. You asked me why I believe that evil is a supernatural force. The reason why I defined evil that why is simply based on my observations. Forgive me for any inaccuracies, but theistic traditions that I am familiar include the act of cleansing a human to remove the evil and similar rituals of exorcisms. My conclusion that evil is a supernatural force embodying living beings is simply based off my second hand knowledge of other religions.In this year of our Lord, MMXIV,
Do you count it as my logic to say that "Before any conception of God is held by man, he knows wrongs committed by his self and towards his self, but is this precisely what is meant by evil?" In that way, would you say that I have concluded from this an affirmation or a negation that does not follow necessarily from its premises? I do not see any conclusive end to which I reached by asking this question. Rather, I have taken what we know to be the case, namely that man is not infused from the beginning with a knowledge of God, but rather comes to that knowledge either by way of instruction or investigation, and that prior to any of those investigations, it is clear that men know their wrongs. How do you mean that it is "sort of circular"? I cannot see this as more than a rhetorical device. Please, help me to see what must clearly be intended as more than rhetoric.
I'm sorry but this is just silly. Outside of compass and straightedge any numerical technique will suffice in producing the value for pi just as accurate as you can construct any circle with radius R.In this year of our Lord, MMXIV,
I would say that on the question of whether without the use of compass and straightedge, if certain transcendental numbers might be used in order to approximate an equivalent area, I could not affirm that the non-constructable has produced any definite figure, as any definite length produced by the geometer, and not only an abstract length, is algebraic, and this is precisely what the transcendental numbers are not.
The geometer is left with the problem of squaring the circle as an impossibility insofar as in res, he finds only constructible numbers.
I would question whether something can exist prior to being conceptually understood. It seems to me that 'what is' (ontology) is in many ways determined by epistemology (how 'things' come to be known), as has been argued by Quine, Sellars, and Wittgenstein, and now by Jorgen and myself at least once each in this very thread. This is how I understand Quine and Sellars when they assert that 'all knowledge is relational'. As such, there are no 'objects' waiting to be discovered, at which point we will form a concept attached to a name/word/term. Rather, concepts influence how we come to understand the objects in the world.In this year of our Lord, MMXIV,
Please, hope that this short addendum to my previous post is worthy of your time.
Insofar as the word stands for a concept, and a concept has been informed by what is, we must say that those words are meaningful, for what else is meaning? Now that this word or that word stands for this concept seems arbitrary, and I would agree with you that it would be incredibly difficult to argue that somehow the meaning of this word is bound up in the formulae of its spelling and pronunciation.
may Truth and Love prevail.
There is in certain less-developed theistic traditions, and here I think specifically of a few Southern Baptist theologians, and post-Ghazalian mohommedan theologians, an inherent divine-command problem of goodness. However, I think that in the scope of natural theology, especially that natural theology that has been well-equipped by Hellenic tools, there must be some notion of inherent goodness in things of this world that belongs to them properly and essentially, and in this way that marks Goodness to be a transcendental of Being, if the natural theologian is to ever say that he can arrive a posteriori at some absolute goodness which is their cause.The reason why I rejected your reply as circular is for the very reason; if god is something that brings good out, then evil is something that brings out bad. To reiterate, you cannot ask a question about evil before the concept of god.
Perhaps that I cannot blame any person for an ambiguity in question, but, without blame, I would stand in saying that the ambiguity of the question does not lead us necessarily to a contradiction, and this I think is the chief weakness of such a rhetorical device, that it does not show in a rigorous or necessary way that such a contradiction is indeed the opposition of terms without a middle.. . . you certainly can't blame Epicurus for the ambiguity that is evil. The author of the quote simply took an observation that evil exists and posed a rhetorical question. [ . . . ] This is the very purpose of the question; to contradict the concept of a deity.
Please, forgive me if I have misused some term, but I would be interested in a longer conversation on this and the relation of transcendental numbers to real objects and whether those abstractions possess a constructability. Would you be interested in reading any of the work that a relatively modern Thomist has done on these questions? If so, I believe that one great text can be found atI'm sorry but this is just silly. Outside of compass and straightedge any numerical technique will suffice in producing the value for pi just as accurate as you can construct any circle with radius R.
I am certainly glad that you did respond; although, I do not quite understand your meaning about fairness, but I have been very glad to read your responses and to have this exchange. I hope that we will have at least a few more conversations in the future.I chose only to respond to the first topic we ran into because I feel that its unfair that you are debating against everyone else. If you have time maybe we can talk about the other topics. Have a good day.
This fair question is one of the first, I think, in a good investigation into scientific inquiry. It would seem that no object might be conceptually understood unless it first participates in being, and, in this, we must say that existence is always prior to essence, for if an object could be concomitantly understood without first being, then we must say that we in a way understand nothing, but if this is the case, then nothing would be, but as that is clearly false, it must not be that we understand nothing.I would question whether something can exist prior to being conceptually understood.
The Omnipotence Objection doesn't apply to the God of the Bible. "Omnipotent" is a fairly modern English word that the ancient Greek and Hebrew authors of the Bible never applied to our god. Rather, the Bible lists several actions which its god literally cannot do.Re: Posts 409 and 411
I'm going to tackle the omnipotence argument first because it's a common way for apologists and other theist philosophers to escape the logical problems with omnipotence. What you seem to be implying is that omnipotence is not the ability to do anything that can possibly be conceived, but merely the ability to do anything that's possible, i.e. anything that doesn't contradict with one's other properties. If we go by this definition, however, then everybody's omnipotent. I'm omnipotent. Everything's constrained by various properties.
The usual counter to this seems to be that "God" can do anything that's logically possible. Yet, think about what this is really saying. To do anything logically possible, one has to lack properties, because properties constrain one's capabilities. To propose an omnipotent "God", therefore, is to describe what God is NOT, rather than what God IS. That's an extremely problematic way of defining anything. Some would go even further as to suggest that a being that has no properties is indistinguishable from nothing.
Titus 1:2 (NASB) said:in the hope of eternal life, which God, who cannot lie, promised long ages ago,
These are just two examples. There are quite a few more clear limitations on what the God of the Bible can and cannot do.II Timothy 2:13 (NASB) said:If we are faithless, He remains faithful, for He cannot deny Himself.
The thing-in-itself does not matter in what I'm saying. To keep declaring that it exists without justification (except a book reference without any further comment) is to completely miss the point I was making. Maybe you're using "knowability" in some objective way, but I'm using it to mean knowable to us, the dust mites living in this universe. If you declare something to exist even though it does not result in any phenomena (alternatively, "cannot be defined"), what's to stop me from declaring the existence of any of an infinitude of undetectable entities? An epistemology that allows that is useless.Flaccus said:For it would seem that meaning is in the conceptual powers of intellectual substances, and not latent in things, unless you mean by this an object's intelligibility, for intelligibility could be counted among the transcendental predicates, as what can be affirmed of any thing that participates in being.
An entity G is defined as having a property P. G is incapable of having the property not-P, without ceasing to be G by definition.It does not follow that there are real properties that one must be without in order to do anything possible. Please, explain this argument in greater detail that I might understand it.
This is not about the existence of "the good". It's about the existence of "God", which, by the most common philosophical definition, intervenes in our lives, among other things.The solutions to your questions I think could only begin to be developed if this first problem is solved, namely whether or not the existence of evil, to which is commonly also called suffering, is absolutely opposed to the existence of the good,
http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/contra/cando.htmlThe Omnipotence Objection doesn't apply to the God of the Bible. "Omnipotent" is a fairly modern English word that the ancient Greek and Hebrew authors of the Bible never applied to our god. Rather, the Bible lists several actions which its god literally cannot do.These are just two examples. There are quite a few more clear limitations on what the God of the Bible can and cannot do.